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Today I want to discuss several related topics dealing with 
the Japanese economy and financial system. First, as a prologue I 
consider the growth prospects of the Japanese economy during the 
next 4 - 5 years. Second, a related issue which will be the main 
focus of my speech, one of the serious problems that the Japanese 
economy faces and will continue to face in the next few years is 
that of non-performing loans of the banking system. Their current 
"financial mess" will be the main theme of my talk today. 
I. Prospects for Japanese Economic Growth 
As you know, the Japanese economy is in its second worst 
recession since the end of the World War II. But that still is not 
a severe recession by American standards; having a very low 
unemployment rate, price stability, and low but positive GNP growth 
do not seem so bad. But from the Japanese perspective it is really 
the first recession that entirely induced from internal sources 
rather than from some external shocks. It is a consequence of what 
was a very long investment growth boom in the real economy and a 
very spectacular asset bubble in the late 1980s of rises in stock 
prices and land prices, which then collapsed beginning in 1990 and 
has persisted until now. The economy has probably now reached its 
trough and will start to recover. But analysts expect that it will 
recover very gradually, a U-shaped pattern rather than V-shaped, 
over the course of the next 6 months to 2 years. There is not much 
consensus among Japanese forecasters about the growth rate for the 
1993 fiscal year, ranging from well less than 2 percent to almost 
4 percent. That is unusual because in Japan there tends to be a 
quite strong consensus as to what growth rates are likely to be. 
My own view is that GNP growth will be slow in 1993 but accelerate 
somewhat next year. 
I do not want to focus on the short-run recovery. Rather, I 
would like to consider the longer run, over the next five years or 
until the end of the century. Through most of my professional 
career I have been very optimistic about Japanese economic growth 
prospects, and I have always been right. So it is tempting simply 
to continue that same extrapolation. That is: continue to be very 
optimistic. The specifics of optimism, of course, change as a 
country goes through different developmental stages. As a follower 
country, optimism may mean 10 percent growth; as a country becomes 
more developed maybe it means 7 percent growth; and as it comes 
closer to the frontier of technology maybe it means 5 percent 
growth. An optimistic projection for Japan over the next 5 years 
would be a growth rate of 3.5 to 4 percent because it really is at 
the frontiers of technological knowledge, it has absorbed the labor 
out of agriculture pretty well, and in other ways it is quite 
mature. So for me the key question is: "will Japan continue to be 
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an unusually rapidly growing economy for its stage of development, 
or will it simply become an ordinary OECD country of 2 - 2.5 
percent growth." 
Two years ago I would have said that Japan will continue to 
grow faster than most of the other industrial countries. But I 
must say, right now, I am beginning to feel more cautious and to 
give more weight to some of the negative factors. I think you all 
know what the positive factors are. Japan has a very high level of 
technological development. If there is any business religion in 
Japan, it is a religion of technological optimism. All businessmen 
really believe that technology will solve all their problems, and 
there is much more commitment to that belief than American or 
European firms have. Maybe the same belief is shared by Korean 
firms. So Japanese firms have a high technological level and a high 
commitment to R&D activities that are, by and large, focused on 
commercial applications, and that is a very positive force for the 
Japanese economy. In Japan, also, there are very well-educated, 
hard-working workers with still some possibilities to allocate 
them to more efficient uses, and that is another positive factor. 
In addition, the savings rate remains high and on the whole, 
economic management, both of the economy and of the individual 
company, is good. 
On the other hand, there are minus factors that are new. 
Labor force growth will come to an end by about 1995. Aggregate 
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labor input will become a negative factor as there will be a 
decline in total hours worked starting from about 1995 on. There 
will be some changes in age composition: average age of the labor 
force will go up. There are two ways of thinking about that. One 
is that older workers are more experienced, have more knowledge and 
therefore, are more productive. The other point is that younger 
workers are cheap, full of energy, and flexible. I do not think 
the change in age composition will affect the labor force as much 
as it does the savings performance because the Japanese household 
savings rate has been declining gradually but steadily for twenty 
years; it reached its peak in 1973. We think of Japan as a high 
saving country when compared to the united states, but that is 
simply because the u.s. is a very low saving country. When we 
compare it to Korea, for instance, the Japanese personal savings 
rate is lower and probably will continue to decline for 
straightforward demographic reasons; a higher and higher percentage 
of the total population will be over 65 and they will save at a 
much lower rate than people who are of working age. 
There are several kinds of structural adjustment problems that 
the Japanese economy, as well as the Korean economy, will face. 
One for the Japanese is that they still have not completed the 
transition out of labor-intensive manufacturing. They still have 
many workers in textiles, in consumer electronics assembly, in many 
components manufactures such as subcontractors for automobiles and 
so forth. Much such production is no longer cost-efficient in 
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Japan so it will eventually have to move offshore. And that means: 
"How will that process go, and how will that affect those workers 
of firms being forced out of business?" It will be a gradual 
process but it is one that will persist for some time. In 
agricul ture, too, there remains a residue of more workers than 
warranted by productivity. Japanese agriculture is technically 
very efficient but the amount of land available to each farm family 
is so small that it is economically very inefficient. In a sense, 
Korea's agricultural future can be predicted by looking at Japan's 
current agricultural problems. So Japan has a problem of 
structural adjustment out of labor-intensive firms, industries, and 
activities. 
There is a different problem of structural adjustment that is 
new to Japan. Japanese companies are very efficient in 
manufacturing production management. But they are not so efficient 
in white-collar overhead administrative costs. They have too many 
layers of managers, and in the future there will be increasing 
pressure to squeeze them down. Moreover there are now too many 
middle-aged company managers who had entered the companies 20 - 25 
years age, who are now 40 - 50 years of old; their companies do not 
really need them and yet have an obligation to keep them until 
normal retirement age. The problem for the companies is how to get 
rid of them gracefully. In the U.S., we don't do it with grace: we 
fire them. As a part of the implicit employment contract in Japan, 
that is not really possible. So what they have to do is to find 
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jobs for them in their subsidiaries or affiliated companies at 
lower wages and reduced future prospects. That is going to be a 
very gradual and difficult process, and it will slow down the 
adjustments Japanese companies will need to make to become more 
efficient. In my view, the structure of the permanent employment 
system will persist, but the degree and nature of commitment will 
weaken. 
II. The Problem of Non-Performing Bank Loans 
In the financial sector, there is a serious problem of the 
overhang of non-performing, or bad, loans. There is really a 
financial mess. It was not a mess that was created by government 
policy loans, unlike the serious difficulties the Korean banking 
system has had. It is a mess that Japanese banks created by 
themsel ves . In the late 198 Os, Japanese banks became very 
aggressive in financing real estate developments, land 
acquisitions, new commercial projects and the like, and on 
increasingly generous terms. Most conservative bankers in Japan 
traditionally made a loan equal to 60 - 80 percent of the value of 
the collateral. But at the height of the "bubble," some banks were 
lending at 110 percent, in other words including the first two 
years of interest payments due in addition to the purchase of the 
land itself. They participated in, and indeed fuelled with credit, 
a speculative real estate boom. This resulted in an extreme and 
excessive exposure by financial institutions in real estate. It is 
interesting to ask: "Why did this occur, why did almost all 
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Japanese financial institutions, even the regulators, accept this 
pattern and degree of lending?" I think the answer is simple: 
there was a myth in Japan that land prices would never go down, or 
that if they did go down, the decline would be small, maybe 10 
percent, and they would start to go back up again within a year or 
so. That the land prices might go down 30, 40, and 50 percent, and 
stay down for 2, 3 or 5 years was not something that any Japanese 
could conceive of as a real possibility. After all, real estate 
had always been the safest asset and form of collateral. 
Some of my students have asked me about this: "Are Japanese 
banks in serious trouble?" I say, "Yes." And then they ask, "will 
there be a financial crisis?" And I say, "No, because the 
government will not allow that to develop." And then they ask: 
"What will happen?" The answer I give is: "Well, there is going to 
be a very slow, painful process of probably rather inefficient 
adjustment by the Japanese banks over a considerable period of 
time." And that is what I want to discuss with you in more detail. 
It is interesting to note that six months ago, Japanese 
bankers were scared because they did not really know exactly how 
serious the bad loan problems were in their banks. They simply did 
not have adequate information on the actual dimensions of their 
problems. In the last six months, I think they had a chance to 
learn and had an opportunity to examine possible ways to resolve 
their problems. Today, Japanese bankers are more optimistic, or at 
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least feel that they are now much more in control of the situation, 
than they felt earlier on. 
Another question frequently asked to me is: "Was the assets 
bubble really caused by Japanese financial deregulation?" The 
answer to that is: "Clearly no." Certainly deregulation created a 
more competitive environment and may have stimulated some financial 
institutions to take on greater risk deliberately as a competitive 
measure because they thought the reward would be high enough to 
justify the risk. But I think we know that even in highly 
regulated system, those who allocate credit can make big mistakes; 
a country can have serious problems of bad loans in very highly 
regulated system as Korea did in the 1980s as well as in a quite 
de-regulated system. 
developing countries. 
That certainly is the experience of many 
In discussing the Japanese banking system and its bad loan 
problems, I focus mainly on structural issues rather than 
recounting some of the scandals and frauds that have taken place. 
There have been some juicy cases but they are not the essence of 
the problems. Japanese banks have faced two kinds of problems. 
One has been to meet the BIS capital adequacy requirements, and the 
other has been to deal with the non-performing loans and their bad 
debt. It is useful to separate the banking system into two groups. 
One group is what is generally termed the "twenty one large banks," 
which includes 11 so-called city banks which do nationwide banking, 
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7 trust banks, and 3 long-term credit banks. In addition there are 
about 130 or so smaller banks that are local and regional in 
operation, plus hundreds more credit associations and credit 
cooperatives that are also local. 
Historical Perspective 
It is important to provide some historical perspective. 
Shortly after World War II, the monetary authorities in Japan, the 
Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan, wanted to create a very 
safe, stable, banking system, and they did that through a 
considerable degree of regulation. In addition, they wanted to 
provide funds for priority uses, without having the government play 
a central role in allocating credit to most industries and 
certainly not to individual firms, but by setting a general policy 
of relatively low interest rates. They did that by imposing 
ceiling interest rates on loans and deposits, by restricting bank 
entry and entry in terms of new branches, and by segmenting 
financial markets: different categories of financial institutions 
for different types of financial markets. In some ways, that 
financial structure closely resembled the recent Korean financial 
structure. The difference, however, was that the Japanese banks 
were mainly responsible themselves for determining their loans: to 
whom they would lend and under what conditions. Nonetheless, the 
spread between the ceiling on deposit rates and loan rates was 
sufficiently wide that even the most marginal banks were 
profitable; this was the way in which the system ensured the 
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safety, not only of the system but also of every individual bank. 
But that wide spread implied that there were inefficiencies 
and costs in the system. The main cost was that interest rates to 
depositors were very low so that depositors were implicitly taxed 
by the system. As a side effect, because of the priority given to 
lending to large firms, small firms had to pay high interest rates 
even though they had good collateral in the oligopolistic, local 
loan market they faced. In that sense, they also were exploited. 
There were various adjustment mechanisms on the loan interest rate 
side, particularly the use of compensating balances as a way of 
raising the effective interest rate close to a market rate. I 
think that is a very desirable mechanism to overcome regulatory 
restrictions on efficient credit allocation through market-like 
mechanisms, and I was disappointed to learn that the Korean 
government recently outlawed that here because alternative 
mechanisms of allocating credit, based on political connections or 
bribes paid to loan officers or techniques of that sort, are 
certainly inferior. Despite this quite regulated rate interest 
system in Japan, on a whole the financial system was relatively 
clean and honest. There was not a lot of corruption in it. And I 
think the part of the reason was because the loan rates were more 
or less adjusted through informal mechanisms. 
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As the financial system and the economy grew, the banks were 
very stable; they collected deposits, the only financial asset 
readily available to savers, and provided the funds to industry. 
They were really a conduit for the dramatic growth of Japanese 
private savings, converting them into productive business 
investment. And because the economy was growing rapidly, wages 
were increasing, and inflation rates were low, the public developed 
great confidence in the government regulatory authorities and 
thought the bankers were doing a great job too. The public 
perception, the first 20 or 30 years of the post-World War II 
period, was that the banking system was high quality. As a 
consequence, people had complete trust in the system and there was 
no need for deposit reserves or insurance. Moreover, even though 
banks were supposed to have a net worth ratio of 10 percent to 
assets, in fact the Ministry of Finance never enforced that. Banks 
were growing very fast and they relied on the retention of profits 
to increase equity. But that equity never became more than 2 - 4 
percent of the balance sheet of the banks. So the banks were 
highly leveraged, which of course added to their profitability. 
Deregulation and Liberalization 
In the mid 1970s the system started to be deregulated and 
liberalized, which was inevitable as well as desirable. It was a 
consequence of the shift of the economy to a somewhat slower growth 
rate and a slowdown of business investment while personal savings 
remained very high. Hence, the 1970s and 1980s were characterized 
as an economy in which private domestic savings tended to be larger 
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than private domestic investment: a typical Keynesian case of 
insufficient private domestic demand. Initially, that was offset 
by government deficit financing; and when the government started 
issuing large amounts of bonds, it forced a market-based system for 
long-term interest rates. On the short-term side, some firms had 
surplus funds and they were pressing for some competitive rates, so 
the repurchase (gensaki) market became very active. Gradually, 
then, market pressures forced the system into considerable 
deregulation. As you know, in the 1980s Japan's savings surplus 
continued and increasingly showed up as a current account surplus 
as Japan exported its savings to the rest of the world. 
On the whole, the deregulation and liberalization process has 
been quite effective. The main criticism was that it was too slow 
and too piecemeal; it has taken 15 years, although it was always 
moving in the right direction. However, there were a couple of by-
products of the deregulation and liberalization process. One was 
as Japan created more competitive markets, those banks that were 
weak became exposed. That has been a problem particularly among 
smaller banks; they lacked economies of scale or their markets were 
local so that they were too undiversified into whatever local 
condi tions were. And in some cases the problem has been mis-
management. A lot of the smaller banks were not managed well and 
a few of them allegedly even were controlled by the underworld 
(yakuza) . 
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Deregulation also affected the performance and strategy of 
large banks. The smaller banks among them felt they were at a 
competitive disadvantage compared to larger city banks. 
Accordingly, there were some mergers among them in order to achieve 
greater regional diversification, and economies of scale and scope. 
It was not due to any particular weakness, but a deliberate 
corporate strategy in response to the perception that in the long 
run larger scale would be essential. Hence deregulation made clear 
that there were some problems related to differences in banks' 
performances and capabilities. 
A second consequence of deregulation was that it reduced the 
value of collecting deposits. Having a branch office that 
collected a lot of deposits was a gold mine in a regulated system 
with very low deposit interest rates and a wide spread. That was 
also the case in Korea when banks could lend money at a much higher 
interest rates than deposit rates. What this meant was that in a 
regulated system if there was a weak bank which the regulatory 
authorities wanted to merge into a larger bank, that weak bank had 
a large dowry in the form of its branch offices which were highly 
profitable deposit collecting institutions. Therefore, it was 
attractive for a strong bank to absorb a weak bank. However, with 
increasing deregulation and resultant competition for deposits, 
there are no particular rents accruing to having a branch office; 
as a consequence, the franchise value of branches has gone down. 
In fact some banks are even beginning to close down branches they 
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regard as marginal which, 10 years ago, would have been unheard of 
in Japan. What that means is that now a weak bank does not have 
large cheap deposit balances to make it an attractive candidate for 
merger. In recent cases of merger or other resolution of problems 
of troubled banks or other financial institutions, the Ministry of 
Finance and the Bank of Japan have had to step in with various 
concessions, including loans at very low interest rates, in order 
to bail them out. 
Meeting BIS capital Adequacy Ratios 
In terms of the BIS capital adequacy ratios, Tier 1 capital 
has to be 4 percent of equity, and Tier 2 can be composed of 
various other forms of capital. Part of the international 
negotiations in the 1980s involved allowing 45 percent of the 
unrealized capital gains of Japanese banks in their securities 
portfolio to count as assets. The reason was that, back in the 
1950s and 1960s, as one element in developing relationships with 
customers, Japanese banks had bought shares in their customer 
companies at very low prices. stock prices were low in the 1950s, 
60s, and 70s in Japan. As stock prices rose, banks developed huge 
unrealized capital gains which did not show up on their balance 
sheets because the shares were valued at purchase cost. The 
Japanese banks (and the Ministry of Finance) argued that the after-
tax value (45 percent) of these unrealized capital gains should be 
allowed to count as Tier 2 capital since they could be liquidated 
at any time. What that meant was that during the stock market boom 
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of the late 1980s, Japanese banks were able to expand their capital 
base very easily. And they needed to do so because in the mid-
1980s, and especially after the BIS agreement was signed in 1987, 
the equity ratio of Japanese banks was very low; they needed to 
raise additional equity directly and they also needed Tier 2 
capital. What the stock market boom did for Japanese banks was to 
make it possible for them to sell new equity issues directly, or 
sometimes in convertible bond forms. It also increased their 
unrealized capital gains, making it very easy for them not only to 
achieve their capital base requirements but to grow very rapidly 
during the period. 
Once the bubble burst and stock prices went down, Japanese 
banks suddenly were under pressure in meeting their BIS 
requirements and had no room to grow. They had to contract their 
balance sheets in order to adjust to the reduced value of their 
capi tal gains; and it was no longer attractive to issue new 
equi ties. In the last two years Japanese banks have reduced 
assets, paid off borrowed money, particularly in the Euro-money 
markets, reduced their share in foreign business, shifted their 
asset portfolio to buying more government bonds which are risk-free 
and therefore do not count against their BIS ratio, and raised Tier 
2 capital through issuing subordinated debt sold mostly to related 
insurance companies. In the future, Japanese banks will have to be 
like all other banks in the world in that they will have to raise 
new capital at market cost. This means that Japanese banks will 
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not have any particular competitive advantage such as they had in 
the 1980s. 
The Real Problem: Bad Debt 
The real problem for the banking system is a bad debt problem, 
or non-performing loans problem. In Japan, a loan is defined as 
not performing if the interest has not been paid for 6 months or 
more. There has been a maj or increase in the number of non-
performing loans. Banks aggressively increased loans, particularly 
to real estate projects in the late 1980s and early 90s, and by the 
late stages of the real estate speculative bubble they made loans 
which could not generate sufficient cash flow from rental use to 
cover the interest costs, much less other operating costs. 
Suddenly, the banks were told by their borrowers: "I am sorry we 
cannot even pay the interest, much less payoff the loans 
themselves." Under normal circumstances, the banks would simply 
take the collateral and sell it, and borrowers would take the 
entire loss. But because the value of the collateral has decreased 
so much, it was not only the borrowers who would have to take 
losses -- the banks themselves were exposed to SUbstantial losses. 
About a quarter of Japanese city bank loans outstanding are to real 
estate, construction, or non-bank financial institutions which they 
control and in turn, made loans for real estate projects. 
The amount of loans involved is huge. 
aggressive lending policies, banks set 
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As a part of their 
up subsidiaries or 
affiliated companies, non-banking financial institutions, that were 
not deposit collecting institutions but mainly borrowed from banks 
and credit associations and relent to real estate companies; in 
many instances they had virtually no equity. In some cases, the 
equity of the non-bank financial institution was one third of one 
percent, and borrowed funds were 99.7 percent. Of course the 
degree of exposure varies substantially by bank .. 
The real estate speculative boom was mainly an urban 
phenomenon, particularly Tokyo and Osaka, and the banks located in 
the big cities were the ones that participated disproportionately 
in the speculative activity. Banks in the smaller cities and towns 
did not have the opportunity to make potentially enormous profits 
but also did not have the opportunity to take huge losses. Thus, 
many banks in rural areas have not suffered the same kind of 
problem as banks, large and small, in large cities; but they had 
other problems such as management inefficiency. The banks which 
specialized in real estate development finance were much more 
exposed; that was particularly true of the seven trust banks which 
are very large banks indeed, have historically specialized in real 
estate projects, and are now in serious trouble. 
The amount of loans formally recognized as non-performing is 
large. The Ministry of Finance's recently released estimate for 21 
largest banks is on the order of 12.7 trillion yen, or about 115 
billion dollars. For the city banks as of the March 1993 annual 
settlement, about 3 percent of their loans are in the non-
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performing category. For the trust banks, they are 7 percent. 
Moreover the range is considerably wider among trust banks; some do 
not have much reported non-performing loans, but one bank has 15 
percent, a serious exposure. On average, non-performing loan 
exposure is less than the total net worth of the city banks or the 
trust banks, but there are probably several trust banks that have 
negative net worth if one had accurate information on their true 
loan position. 
Part of the problem has been that banks have not fully 
disclosed their bad loan situation. What they have disclosed is 
only a part of their problem. For instance, most banks make new 
loans to finance the interest on outstanding loans which certain 
borrowers cannot repay. Then the loan is not considered non-
performing. It is technically a performing loan although it is not 
worth much. That is a dilemma that seems to be increasing in 
Japan. Some estimates are that non-performing loans are a 25 - 30 
trillion yen problem, instead of 12 or 13 trillion yen problem. 
Some suggest the problem may be even larger. However, that does 
not mean that these non-performing loans represent 100 percent 
losses they cannot be repaid in full or cannot be serviced, because 
often they are backed by some collateral. 
The problem is that no one is really sure what the exact value 
of collateral is, on average, because the real estate market has 
dried up. And no institution wants to sell in today's real estate 
market because they fear the price is too low so that if they just 
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wait for a couple of years, it will go back up. Or they fear that 
if they start selling, prices will go down further so that the rest 
of their real estate-based loan portfolio will be worth even less. 
Accordingly there is no real market test of how serious the problem 
is. Rough estimates are that collateralized real estate could be 
sold at about one-half its collateralized value, so that perhaps 
half of the loan value could be recaptured. 
Two Alternative strategies for Coping 
There are two ways, both for institutions and as a matter of 
public policy, to deal with the bad loan problem. One is to write 
off the loans as rapidly as possible, and take the hit quickly; set 
aside loss reserves, write down profits, and stop paying dividends. 
That has been the approach of many American banks with bad loans. 
The other approach is to continue to carry the loan on the bank's 
books, and re-negotiate the terms of the loan at a very low 
interest rate in order that it not be classified as non-performing. 
However that is costly because the bank has to forego interest 
income and has lower profits for a longer period of time than 
otherwise. 
In Japan some extraordinary bank loan re-negotiations have 
been taking place. The Japan Housing Loan Corporation re-
negotiated its several trillion yen of borrowings from banks, 
agricultural cooperatives, and other financial institutions. Its 
9 major banks agreed to extend their existing loans, amounting to 
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billions of dollars, for 10 years at zero interest rate, and to 
make additional loans available at below market rates in order to 
keep the company in operation. This practice, while preventing the 
problem from surfacing as non-performing loans, means the profit 
rate of banks are inevitably reduced because they have to finance 
these loans and earn negative interest: their cost of funds are of 
course substantially higher than the loans rates they are 
receiving. 
Why would Japanese banks prefer to hide many of their bad loan 
problems rather than writing them off? One reason is that if the 
underlying problem is that of bad management of the borrowing 
companies, then the bank can simply get rid of their management, 
restructure, and over time rehabilitate fundamentally profitable 
companies, so it does not make sense to put them out of business. 
That is the essence of the main bank system's approach to handling 
companies in distress. Another reason is that banks expect (or 
hope) that land and real estate prices will go up again eventually; 
the collateral for their loans will have sufficiently high value 
that they will take or little no loss. 
Japanese banks are unlikely to grow rapidly during the next 5 
-10 years. Accordingly, they are not likely to generate large 
profits to use to diminish the size of their current problems. 
Therefore the second strategy, "the Japanese gradualist approach," 
the banks are currently pursuing is a potentially costly and risky 
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strategy. It is costly because, as I said before, of the negative 
interest spread. It is also costly in a different way in that it 
diverts management attention. It devotes bank management talent to 
dealing with problem companies and loans, rather than having that 
talent go out and create good, new business. The advantage of 
writing off bad loans is that the bank does not have to bother with 
them anymore. There are other problems as well. In order to keep 
these bad loan companies alive, the banks have to lend to them not 
only the rolled-over and renegotiated old loans but new money on 
low terms. Eventually that will tend to result in a reduction in 
the credit rating of these Japanese banks, which will significantly 
affect their cost of funds. There is tremendous lack of 
transparency in all these arrangements. The public does not really 
know how many loans are being re-negotiated at what terms, bank by 
bank; accordingly there is a tendency to fear the worst and 
therefore to charge a risk premium for making funds available to 
these banks. 
The gradualist approach is also risky for another reason. 
Suppose the real estate market in Japan does not turn up 
significantly in the next 5 or next 10 years, and suppose prices 
remain more or less where they are now. After all, Japanese real 
estate prices are still high by international standards. If that 
happens, those banks which support real estate companies with low, 
even zero, interest rate loans will have to pay twice at the end of 
the period because the collateral will not be worth any more than 
it is now, and the loans will have to be written off eventually 
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anyway. Many of the proj ects, particularly for commercial and 
office buildings that were started in 1989 and 1990 are just now 
being completed and coming on to the market. For the first time in 
urban areas Japan will have considerable surplus office space; as 
a result, the rental rate for new office space has dropped by up to 
50 percent in recent months. That means these projects are 
generating less cash flow than expected, which means their 
underlying economic value is being reduced, and it will be more 
difficult to justify even current price levels, much less the 
prices expected when the project was initiated. 
If the banks understand this, and indeed they do, why don't 
they simply write off bad loans as fast as they can? Aside from 
the answers already noted, the regulatory authorities have 
encouraged the gradualist approach. Japan's Ministry of Finance, 
like those throughout the world, does not like to lose tax revenue 
from reductions in bank profits. So it makes it difficult for 
Japanese banks to write off losses until they have actually been 
taken, under quite restrictive definitions of actual loss. As an 
ameliorative device, they have created a new institution that will 
buy collateral at approximately market prices from the banks, using 
funds borrowed from the banks equal to each specific transaction. 
In that way, the bank can write off its loss in order to obtain the 
tax benefit immediately. Some in the financial community hoped 
that the government would even provide low interest rate loans to 
fund this institution, but (to my surprise) the rest of the 
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business community complained. Peak business organizations in 
effect publicly said: "We don't see why the government has to use 
the taxpayers' money to bailout rich banks and bankers. Bankers 
get paid 30 percent more than we do, why don't you (bankers) cut 
your own costs before you start talking about using our taxpayers' 
money?" So direct government funding is out of the question for 
the present; nonetheless, if more severe problems should develop, 
this new institutional mechanism for pumping in government funds is 
now in place. 
I think part of the reason for pursuing this "gradualist" 
approach is that the Ministry of Finance is very reluctant to see 
all these bad loans exposed. Reluctant because they are fearful 
that it will lead to bank runs, or some other forms of perceived 
decline in the safety of the banking system, and because it would 
be embarrassing since the bad loan problems make clear that they 
did a poor job of bank monitoring and supervision. The regulatory 
authorities evidently believed the same myth that land price 
declines would never be a serious, systemic problem. 
The costs of bad loans have to be borne by someone. Of course 
the borrower, corporate or individual, is the most immediate loser, 
since the borrowings have to be paid not only from the realized 
value of the specific real estate collateral but any other assets 
commi tted against the loan. But the bad loan problems are so 
severe, as already noted, that the borrowers will be able to repay 
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only in part. 
costs. These 
Banks are the next in line of those bearing the 
costs are shared by shareholders through lower 
profits and lower prices of bank shares. They are also shared by 
the tax authorities (and indirectly by all taxpayers) in the form 
of lower corporate taxes on the reduced bank profits. It is not 
clear how much further that the sharing of costs (losses) will go, 
though I feel quite sure banks will not be allowed to fail. 
Certainly depositors are not going to lose any money in Japan, any 
more than in the united states, even if a bank is liquidated, 
because that would severely undermine the integrity of the entire 
financial system. No country can afford to allow depositors to 
take losses, as a result of a de facto bank failure, particularly 
by any bank of significant size. Then the question is to what 
extent the losses will be funded ei ther by taxpayers' money 
(infusion of government funds) or by reduced profits and even 
reductions in bank equity. 
The performance and degree of bad debt exposure among banks in 
all categories vary considerably. Some may well be de facto 
insolvent, though the extremity of their difficulties remain 
hidden. I expect there to be further consolidation of the Japanese 
banking industry, but through mergers rather than formal failures 
and liquidation. A number of smaller banks and credit associations 
will merge, weak into strong. While there may be few further 
mergers among city banks, it is likely that several of the weakest 
trust banks will be absorbed by city banks or other large financial 
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institutions. However, since these mergers are much less 
attractive to strong banks than before due to the decline in 
franchise value of deposit collecting branch offices, in order to 
make these negotiations possible the Ministry of Finance and Bank 
of Japan will have to provide sUbstantial subsidies in one form or 
another: loans from the Bank of Japan at the low official discount 
rate; tax breaks; possibly even low interest loans through the 
Ministry of Finance's Trust Fund Bureau, utilizing postal savings 
accumulations. Already in a couple of cases of small financial 
institution rescue the deposit insurance fund has made outright 
grants in order to cover shortfalls. Of course these arrangements 
not only are specific to each case, they are not made public, a 
continuation of the lack of transparency on the part of the 
regulatory authorities. Nonetheless, we can be sure that the 
authorities will do whatever is necessary to prevent the emergence 
of a financial crisis through fear (much less actuality) of an 
explicit bank failure. Indeed, they probably will err too much on 
the side of caution (and subsidy). 
III Concluding Comments 
Let me summarize by saying that the Japanese bad loan 
situation is roughly comparable to the u.s. bank problems of loans 
to less developed countries in the late 1970s and in the early 
1980s, or to current u.s. real estate loan problems. Both were 
handled by rapid write-offs and establishment of loan loss 
reserves. The Japanese case is not as bad as the u.s. savings & 
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loan association crisis which had to be handled by massive 
infusions of government funds. The process of adjustment will be 
somewhat different in Japan in that it will be more gradual and 
piecemeal. Japanese banks will also have to rely on maintaining a 
wide interest spread in order to generate sUbstantial operating 
surpluses to cover the costs of losses actually taken as debts are 
written off plus the hidden but very real costs of negative 
interest rate spreads on renegotiated loans that otherwise would be 
non-performing. However, financial markets are highly competitive 
for lending to large, top quality firms, which are able to issue 
bonds or borrow from insurance companies or other financial 
institutions. Thus, to maintain wider spreads banks will have to 
shift their loan portfolios increasingly from top-flight ones to 
smaller and less well known companies where the bank's monitoring 
capabilities are better able to evaluate creditworthiness than is 
the marketplace. 
One of the interesting things to come out of this financial 
mess has been some reduction in the credibility of the Ministry of 
Finance. In the past, the Ministry of Finance in Japan has been 
close to God, popularly regarded as close to infallible. But now 
some Japanese are saying: "They didn't really do a very good job. 
There's all of these problems that have emerged and obviously the 
regulatory authorities were not very effective supervisors." 
Bankers also have suffered some loss of reputation. There have 
been not only the general problem of bad loans but also some 
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spectacular cases of very strange, non-transparent arrangements, 
kickbacks, and even fraud. For example, one woman, an owner of a 
restaurant in Osaka, was able to borrow the yen equivalent of 2.5 
billion dollars from banks, using certificates of deposits and bank 
stock as collateral; how she was able to is rather mysterious. As 
stock prices declined, collateral was fraudulently handled, and 
eventually her entire house of cards collapsed with sUbstantial 
losses to her prestigious leaders. 
been a number, have sullied the 
Such scandals, and there have 
reputations of some banks, 
securities companies, housing loan companies, and the senior 
managers involved. 
The restructuring of otherwise non-performing loans, mainly to 
real estate companies and a variety of non-bank financial 
institutions, is proving to be particularly complex and difficult. 
Bank exposures are particularly large, both directly and through 
their subsidiary non-bank financial institutions which were little 
more than conduits for the funds of banks. In many of these bad 
loan cases, the main bank relationship is not strong, and a large 
number of financial institutions are involved as lenders. There is 
a tremendous amount of in-fighting, twisting of arms (and provision 
of carrots as well) by the regulatory authorities, and utilization 
of political connections, in determining how losses will be shared. 
Credit associations and agricultural cooperatives, which had 
increasingly become major lenders with some official encouragement, 
have been uncooperative in so far as being willing to take 
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reduction in the interest rates on their outstanding loans to these 
institutions in trouble. They say: "We are just innocent 
bystanders and you guys (banks) told us to come in and make these 
loans. So you handle the problem and take the loss." These 
negotiations are not very transparent. So it is difficult to know 
what is actually going on, and how large the amounts of 
renegotiated loans at negative spreads are. They surely will 
become even larger over the course of the next year or two. 
In conclusion I think there are cautionary lessons to be 
learned from the Japanese case, and they are quite obvious. As in 
all cases of speculative bubbles, greed overcomes fear, and 
rational business analysis is replaced by euphoria and the myth 
that prices will not decline. That was the case in the Japanese 
real estate financing in the late 1980s and it has created serious 
problems now for the banking system. That could happen in other 
countries as well. Even Korea is not immune. 
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